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SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE RISE IN CONSUMER
BARGAINING POWER
Wayne R. Barnes*
I.

INTRODUCTION

When consumers enter into transactions with commercial enterprises,
they almost invariably do so through the use of standard form contracts.
The disparity in bargaining power between consumers and commercial
enterprises is generally complete and absolute. Consumers are typically
not able to negotiate the individual terms of form contracts, and so they
cannot dicker with the company over onerous terms such as liability
limitations, warranty exclusions, and the like. Consumers would, in most
instances, not be able to understand the various legal issues at stake even if
they had the bargaining power necessary to seek more favorable
contractual terms at the time of contract formation. The idea that
consumers can properly consent to form contracts is conceptually flawed,
but has nevertheless been universally recognized and enforced by the
courts absent serious defects in the bargaining process such as fraud,
duress, or unconscionability. Consumers generally agree to contractual
terms after having little to no say in the process, other than the simple
decision of whether to purchase the goods or services from the company,
and are bound by the terms dictated by the merchant.1
Buried in form contracts, which have been consented to by masses of
consumers, exist a myriad of terms that are both favorable to the companies
who drafted the terms and correspondingly unfavorable to the consumers
who are held to have consented to them. These terms include things like
damages limitations, warranty limitations or exclusions, arbitration clauses,
* Professor, Texas Wesleyan University School of Law. I would like to thank Texas
Wesleyan University School of Law for its generous research assistance provided for this
Article. Thanks also to my colleagues at Texas Wesleyan for their helpful comments at a
faculty colloquium in the Spring 2011 semester, and to the participants at the Sixth Annual
International Contracts Conference at Stetson University School of Law in February 2011.
Finally, thanks to Bonnie Bundens and Desireé Slaybaugh for their research assistance.
1. See generally discussion infra Part II (discussing the law generally applicable to
standard form contracts and bargaining).
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penalty fees, personal information disclosure, and other similar types of
contractual clauses. The consumer is legally bound by the terms contained
in the form contract, because, in theory, he has a duty (and is able) to read
the contract, could have done so if he had desired, and ultimately indicated
his assent to the form by signing, clicking, or otherwise outwardly
manifesting his assent to the form contract’s terms. But, again, few
consumers are even cognizant of these terms, let alone capable of
bargaining for more favorable treatment in these areas regardless of
cognizance. The terms are “take-it-or-leave-it.”2
Most of the time, nothing really comes of the unfavorable terms
during the life of the consumer-merchant contractual relationship because
the contingencies triggering them usually fail to occur. That is, most of the
time the consumers’ purchases are not faulty and do not cause injury or
damage. Thus, the consumer does not need to assert any right of recourse.
Sometimes, however, injuries do arise, and it is for just such an eventuality
that the merchant has inserted the favorable clauses in the contract. At that
point, the merchant may want to control the consumer’s recovery of
damages by limiting his available remedies, or force the consumer into
accepting a less favorable dispute resolution process, such as binding
arbitration rather than a jury trial before a jury of the consumer’s peers.
Furthermore, most of the time, in bargaining about such terms, the
consumer has no more power over the merchant at this post-formation
phase, during which his expectations have been disappointed, than he had
at the original moment of contract formation. The consumer is at the
mercy of the legally binding contract that he signed or clicked, and that the
merchant is within its contractual and legal rights to enforce.
Recently, however, some consumers have used social media to assert
a new kind of power over merchants. That is, these consumers have
purchased goods or services by form contracts that contain unfavorable
terms, and the eventualities that such terms are designed to address have in
fact come to pass. When their initial efforts to protest for more favorable
treatment than the contract terms technically require failed to yield any
recourse to these consumers, they took their protests online into the social
media—in the form of Facebook pages, Twitter posts, or YouTube
videos—where their complaints are heard by hundreds, thousands, or
sometimes even millions of other consumers. Faced with such online
complaints which have garnered substantial attention, several merchants
have relented and granted more favorable treatment than their contract
terms otherwise required. This has arguably resulted in more bargaining
power for these consumers making use of such social media avenues.3
2. Id.
3. See infra Part III (portraying instances where consumers have utilized social media
to obtain favorable resolutions in disputes with merchants).
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This Article will describe this phenomenon in its contract and
bargaining contexts, and discuss the implications of social media for
consumer bargaining. Part II of the Article will discuss the law generally
applicable to standard form contracts and bargaining, as well as the
cognitive and psychological defects that are involved in consumers’
bargaining processes. Part III will discuss several instances where
consumers have used social media to obtain favorable resolutions of
disputes that were not otherwise required by the terms of the standard form
contracts to which they originally agreed when they purchased the goods or
services. Part IV will discuss some implications of these developments for
consumer bargaining power and the operation of the marketplace. Part V
will offer a brief conclusion.
II.

STANDARD FORM CONTRACTS: LAW AND CONTEXT

A.

Governing Doctrine

Standard form contracts are universally used by merchants contracting
with consumers:
Standard form contracts probably account for more than ninetynine percent of all the contracts now made. Most persons have
difficulty remembering the last time they contracted other than by
standard form; except for casual oral agreements, they probably
never have. But if [consumers] are active, they contract by
standard form several times a day. Parking lot and theater
tickets, package receipts, department store charge slips, and gas
station credit card purchase slips are all standard form contracts.4
Since David Slawson wrote his influential article four decades ago, the
use of form contracts has only increased,5 especially with online contract

4. W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of
Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 529 (1971). One of the first scholarly
discussions of the use of form contracts described the phenomenon this way:
No longer do individuals bargain for this or that provision in the contract . . . .
The control of the wording of those contracts has passed into the hands of the
concern, and the drafting into the hands of its legal advisor . . . . In the trades
affected it is henceforth futile for an individual to attempt any modification, and
incorrect for the economist and lawyer to classify or judge such arrangements as
standing on an equal footing with individual agreements.
Michael I. Meyerson, The Reunification of Contract Law: The Objective Theory of
Consumer Form Contracts, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1263, 1264 (1993) (quoting OTTO
PRAUSNITZ, THE STANDARDIZATION OF COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS IN ENGLISH AND
CONTINENTAL LAW 18 (1937)).
5. See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1203 (2003) (observing that “nearly all
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terms—such as website terms of use and software license agreements—to
which consumers assent by use of “clickwrap” or “browsewrap.”6 Robert
Hillman and Jeffrey Rachlinski noted that “[t]he Internet is turning the
process of contracting on its head.”7 Thus, consumers are assenting to form
contracts in ever-increasing amounts, especially online, with the ease of a
mouse click (or tablet screen tap).8
Todd Rakoff articulated seven characteristics of standard form
contracts and their transactional use:
1.The document whose legal validity is at issue is a printed
form that contains many terms and clearly purports to be
a contract.
2.The form has been drafted by, or on behalf of, one party to
the transaction.
3.The drafting party participates in numerous transactions of
the type represented by the form and enters into these
transactions as a matter of routine.
4.The form is presented to the adhering party [i.e., the
consumer] with the representation that, except perhaps
for a few identified items (such as the price term), the
drafting party will enter into the transaction only on the
terms contained in the document. This representation
may be explicit or may be implicit in the situation, but it
is understood by the adherent.
5.After the parties have dickered over whatever terms are
open to bargaining, the document is signed by the
adherent.
6.The adhering party enters into few transactions of the type
represented by the form—few, at least, in comparison
with the drafting party.
7.The principal obligation of the adhering party in the
transaction considered as a whole is the payment of
money.9

commercial and consumer sales contracts are form driven”).
6. Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the
Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 431 (2002) (citing Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, The
License is the Product: Comments on the Promise of Article 2B for Software and
Information Licensing, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 891, 895–99 (1998)).
7. Id. at 429.
8. Wayne R. Barnes, Toward a Fairer Model of Consumer Assent to Standard Form
Contracts: In Defense of Restatement Subsection 211(3), 82 WASH. L. REV. 227, 229
(2007).
9. Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1173, 1177 (1983).
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Businesses use form contracts for many reasons, including risk
reduction, efficiency, and lowered costs.10
From the consumer’s
perspective, the following observations are generally true with respect to
form contracts: (1) consumers do not have the bargaining power to seek
more favorable terms; (2) the contingencies that the form contract terms are
designed to address are unlikely to happen; (3) consumers do not shop or
compare competitors’ terms for anything beyond price, for the most part;
and (4) consumers believe they can ignore the technical language of the
contract in favor of trusting the business to treat them fairly, in spite of
what the contract says.11 Therefore, consumers generally do not bother
reading the language in form contracts.12
The unilateral nature of form contracts is at odds with the
paradigmatic ideal of two contracting parties with full knowledge of all
terms being discussed, with vigorous bargaining and debate about the final
terms in the contract.13 That is, “[d]eeply embedded within the law of
contracts, viewed as private law, lies the image of individuals meeting in
the marketplace . . . .”14 This lack of bargaining or negotiation in the
standard form context is recognized in the comments to Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 211:
A party who makes regular use of a standardized form of
agreement does not ordinarily expect his customers to understand
or even to read the standard terms. One of the purposes of
standardization is to eliminate bargaining over details of
individual transactions, and that purpose would not be served if a
substantial number of customers retained counsel and reviewed
the standard terms. Employees regularly using a form often have
only a limited understanding of its terms and limited authority to
10. Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of
Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 631–32 (1943); see also Slawson, supra note 4, at 530–
31 (explaining the predominance of standard form contracts in society).
11. Rakoff, supra note 9, at 1225–28.
12. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 370–
71 n.338 (1960); IAN MACNEIL, CONTRACTS 445 (2d ed. 1978); Robert A. Hillman,
Debunking Some Myths About Unconscionability: A New Framework for U.C.C. Section 2302, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 13 (1981); Arthur A. Leff, Unconscionability and the Crowd—
Consumers and the Common Law Tradition, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 349, 349 (1970); Karl N.
Llewellyn, The Effect of Legal Institutions Upon Economics, 15 AM. ECON. REV. 665, 673
(1925); Rakoff, supra note 9, at 1179 (citing P. S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM
OF CONTRACT 731 (1979)); Arnold L. Rotkin, Standard Forms: Legal Documents in Search
of an Appropriate Body of Law, 1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 599, 603 (1977); Slawson, supra note 4,
at 531; William C. Whitford, The Functions of Disclosure Regulation in Consumer
Transactions, 1973 WIS. L. REV. 400, 425–26 (1973).
13. Slawson, supra note 4, at 529 (“The contracting still imagined by courts and law
teachers as typical, in which both parties participate in choosing the language of their entire
agreement, is no longer of much more than historical importance.”).
14. Rakoff, supra note 9, at 1216.
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vary them. Customers do not in fact ordinarily understand or
even read the standard terms.15
Typically, the consumer neither reads nor negotiates the vast majority
of form contract terms, and commentators have struggled with the notion
that consumers can consent to the full range of terms to a particular
transaction.16 Michael Meyerson noted that “[s]tandard form contracts
have been in use for over two centuries, and the question of the proper
construction of these contracts has haunted contract law ever since.”17 Karl
Llewellyn wrote one of the first and clearest explanations of the nature of
consumer assent to form contracts:
Instead of thinking about “assent” to boiler-plate clauses, we can
recognize that so far as concerns the specific, there is no assent at
all. What has in fact been assented to, specifically, are the few
dickered terms, and the broad type of the transaction, and but one
thing more. That one thing more is a blanket assent (not a
specific assent) to any not unreasonable or indecent terms the
seller may have on his form, which do not alter or eviscerate the
reasonable meaning of the dickered terms. The fine print which
has not been read has no business to cut under the reasonable
meaning of those dickered terms which constitute the dominant
and only real expression of agreement, but much of it commonly
belongs in.18
Llewellyn’s analysis astutely perceives that the consumer, expressly or
implicitly, places trust in the merchant with respect to the terms that the
consumer chooses not to read or understand.19 As Robert Braucher more
memorably put it, during the American Law Institute’s deliberations on the
Second Restatement, “We all know that if you have a page of print,
whether it’s large or small, which nobody is really expected to read, and
you expect to agree to it, and you sort of put your head in the lion’s mouth
and hope it will be a friendly lion.”20
Modern form contract law has evolved in a fairly direct path from
Llewellyn’s original formulation. The “duty to read” rule posits that the
consumer who outwardly manifests assent to a form contract, typically by
signing it, is presumed to have agreed to be subject to the entirety of its
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. b (1981).
16. See id. § 17(1) (1981) (stating that “the formation of a contract requires a bargain in
which there is a manifestation of mutual assent to the exchange and a consideration”).
17. Meyerson, supra note 4, at 1263–64 (noting that the first standard form contracts
were used in the late 1700s for marine insurance contracts).
18. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 370
(1960).
19. Barnes, supra note 8, at 240–41 (citing Rakoff, supra note 9, at 1200).
20. Robert Braucher, The American Law Institute Forty-Seventh Annual Meeting, 47
A.L.I. PROC. 525 (1970).
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terms.21 That is, “one having the capacity to understand a written document
who reads it, or, without reading it or having it read to him, signs it, is
bound by his signature.”22 Not only that, but as Rakoff further observed, “it
is legally irrelevant whether the [consumer] actually read the contents of
the document, or understood them, or subjectively assented to them.”23
Although a consumer is generally bound by the terms of a form
contract to which he assented, there are some narrow doctrinal exceptions.24
Perhaps the primary safeguard exception is the doctrine of
unconscionability. Unconscionability is sometimes characterized as “that
which ‘affronts the sense of decency’” or that which is “outside the limits
of what is reasonable or acceptable: shockingly unfair, harsh, or unjust.”25
A consumer may avoid enforcement of the contract if a court determines it
to be unconscionable.26 Unfortunately for aggrieved consumers, however,
unconscionability is not usually successful in court,27 since it only avoids
21. JOSEPH PERILLO, 7 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 29.8, at 402 (Rev. ed. 2002).
22. Id. at 402–03 (quoting Rossi v. Douglas, 100 A.2d 3, 7 (Md. 1953)); see also
Rakoff, supra note 9, at 1185 (explaining that “[t]he adherent’s signature on a document
clearly contractual in nature, which he had an opportunity to read, will be taken to signify
his assent and thus will provide the basis for enforcing the contract . . . .”).
23. Rakoff, supra note 9, at 1185. Rakoff also stated, consistent with Llewellyn’s
formulation, that “the adherent’s assent covers all the terms of the document, and not just
the custom-tailored ones or the ones that have been discussed.” Id.
24. See id. (outlining the fact that “[e]xceptions to the foregoing principles are narrow.
In particular, failure of the drafting party to point out or explain the form terms does not
constitute an excuse. Instead, in the absence of extraordinary circumstances, the adherent
can establish an excuse only by showing affirmative participation by the drafting party in
causing misunderstanding . . . .”).
25. JOSEPH PERILLO, 7 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 29.8, at 372–73 (Rev. ed. 2002)
(quoting Gimbel Bros. v. Swift, 62 Misc.2d 156, 307 N.Y.S.2d 952 (Civ. Ct. 1970)); see
also Unconscionability, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY, UNABRIDGED (3d ed.
2000).
26. See, e.g., UCC § 2-302; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1979):
If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is made a
court may refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the remainder of the
contract without the unconscionable term, or may so limit the application of any
unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable result.
Unconscionability is usually held to comprise two elements:
(1) procedural
unconscionability and (2) substantive unconscionability. Arthur A. Leff, Unconscionability
and the Code—The Emperor’s New Clause, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967). Procedural
unconscionability deals with the contracting process—that is, the unequal bargaining power
between the parties and relative inaccessibility of boilerplate language in form contracts.
Substantive unconscionability deals instead with the substantive contents of the agreement.
Therefore, the court may refuse to enforce such terms as “are immoral, conflict with public
policy, deny a party substantially what she bargained for, or have no reasonable purpose in
the trade.” Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 456–57 (citing ROBERT A. HILLMAN, THE
RICHNESS OF CONTRACT LAW: AN ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF
CONTRACT LAW 138 (1997)).
27. See generally Larry A. DiMatteo & Bruce L. Rich, A Consent Theory of
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enforcements of contracts found to be “extraordinarily unfair.”28
The result of this legal regime is that consumers are simply bound to
the terms of their form contracts in the vast majority of instances. The fact
that certain contingencies later occur subsequent to formation—such as the
occurrence of a defect in the product—do not change this result. In fact,
such an eventuality is the very reason the business placed the favorable
term in the form contract in the first place. Thus, existing contract law
doctrine results in consumers being bound by unfavorable terms like
liability limitations and warranty exclusions, once these issues are brought
to a head by the occurrence of disappointed expectations.
Short of legal recourse or the ability of the consumer to negotiate a
favorable resolution with the merchant in the face of disappointed
expectations, the consumer has only one significant remaining option—
namely, the marketplace itself. A consumer who is disappointed by the
outcome of his contract with a particular merchant may always exercise his
autonomous right to refrain from further dealings with such merchant, and
instead to choose to take his business elsewhere in the future.29 This
consumer power to vote with dollars, although not tantamount to a legal
mechanism to compensate lost expectations under contract law, still gives
the consumer an important ability to nevertheless vindicate his preferences
and expectations for ideal business contracting behavior.30 But, insofar as
legalities are concerned, the consumer is bound—both at the time of
formation, and subsequently after the occurrence of the eventualities that
cause the consumer’s expectations to be disappointed.
B.

Behavioral and Cognitive Context

In addition to the legal doctrine governing the formation of standard
form contracts set forth above, scholars in other disciplines have addressed
the behavioral and cognitive defects of consumers in making decisions to
enter into such contracts with merchants. A discussion of these defects will
Unconscionability: An Empirical Analysis of Law in Action, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1067
(2006) (providing empirical data on rates of success of unconscionability claims).
28. Meyerson, supra note 4, at 1286 (citing Jeffrey Davis, Revamping Consumer-Credit
Contract Law, 68 VA. L. REV. 1333, 1337 (1982)); see also Barnes, supra note 8, at 248
(citing Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 457) (“[S]hort of outright oppression or
conscience-shocking terms, courts have been much less predictable in using
unconscionability as a tool for policing terms to which consumers did not clearly assent and
which are otherwise unfair or extremely unfavorable.”).
29. See Todd D. Rakoff, The Law and Sociology of Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV.
1235, 1237 (2006) (declaring that “[v]iewed now as part of a working social system,
contracts are assumed to be the products of competition in the marketplace”).
30. See generally Wayne Barnes, Consumer Assent to Standard Form Contracts and
the Voting Analogy, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 839 (2010) (discussing consumers’ ability to reflect
preferences through selection of merchants with whom to bargain).
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aid in the discussion of the social media phenomenon that is the primary
purpose of this Article.
1.

Cognitive and Psychological Problems: Bounded Rationality,
Disposition, and Defective Capability

In 1995, Professor Melvin Eisenberg published The Limits of
Cognition and the Limits of Contract, in which he articulated the “complex
of social propositions [which] supports the bargain principle.”31 Eisenberg
observed that consumers have historically been presumed to be able to
assess what is valuable, and to only enter into purposefully profitable
contracts that result in a net social gain.32 And, Eisenberg further observed,
these presumptions were historically premised on the notion that such
consumers “act with full cognition to rationally maximize [their] subjective
expected utility.”33 However, Eisenberg assembled an impressive array of
evidence from other disciplines to show that consumers frequently defy this
rational choice model, as a result of human “limits of cognition.”34 Stated
another way, consumers have limited cognitive ability to judge the risks
and pitfalls associated with transacting by form contract.35 Professor
Eisenberg recognized three particular types of limitations that govern
consumers’ transaction choices: bounded rationality, disposition, and
defective capability.36
Bounded rationality describes the reality that people do not have
unlimited computer-like powers of analysis.37 People have limited time,
money, energy, and memory, and so cannot make “perfect” decisions when
entering into contracts.38 Since people cannot make “optimal” marketplace
choices, they tend to settle for merely “satisfactory alternatives”:
An alternative is optimal if: (1) there exists a set of criteria
that permits all alternatives to be compared, and (2) the
alternative in question is preferred, by these criteria, to all other
31. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47
STAN. L. REV. 211, 211 (1995).
32. Id. at 211–12.
33. Id. at 212.
34. Id.
35. Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 450 (citing Eisenberg, supra note 31, at
214–16).
36. Eisenberg, supra note 31, at 213.
37. See Korobkin, supra note 5, at 1216–44 (discussing bounded rationality theory and
its implications for countering the usual assumptions of consumers’ rational choices in
economic theory of contracts).
38. Id. at 214; see also Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 451 (“[P]sychologists
long have believed that when making a decision, such as whether to enter into a contract,
people rarely invest in a complete search for information, nor do they fully process the
information they receive.”).
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alternatives. An alternative is satisfactory if: (1) there exists a
set of criteria that describes minimally satisfactory alternatives,
and (2) the alternative in question meets or exceeds all these
criteria.
Most human decisionmaking [sic], whether individual or
organizational, is concerned with the discovery and selection of
satisfactory alternatives; only in exceptional cases is it concerned
with the discovery and selection of optimal alternatives . . . . An
example is the difference between searching a haystack to find
the sharpest needle in it and searching the haystack to find a
needle sharp enough to sew with.39
Since people cannot take every single piece of information into
account in their decision-making, they tend to purposefully resolve to
remain unaware of many such sources of information and conclude that is
the only rational alternative since they cannot cognitively take it all into
account anyway.40 Psychologists have further observed that when
consumers make such choices to be rationally ignorant, they tend to
construe the contract they have entered into as comporting with their
formed conclusions about the terms.41 Accordingly, bounded rationality
posits that people have limited cognitive abilities to consider all relevant
information in making transacting choices, and therefore will logically
decide not to consider all information and potential eventualities in making
their contracting choices.
39. Eisenberg, supra note 31, at 214 (quoting JAMES G. MARCH & HERBERT A. SIMON,
ORGANIZATIONS 140–41 (1st ed. 1958)). Eisenberg notes that Simon has proposed a
decision-making model called “satisficing”—“Whereas economic man maximizes—selects
the best alternative from among all those available to him, his cousin, administrative man,
satisfices—looks for a course of action that is satisfactory or ‘good enough.’” Id. at 215
(citing HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR xxix (3d ed. 1976)); see also David
M. Grether, Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, The Irrelevance of Information Overload: An
Analysis of Search and Disclosure, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 287 n.18 (1986) (defining
“satisficing” as “failing to choose the best”); Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 451
(noting that consumers “rely on casually acquired, partial information, sufficient to make
them comfortable with their choice: a process referred to as ‘satisficing’”).
40. Eisenberg, supra note 31, at 215; see also Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 6, at
452. “[P]eople tend to reduce their decisions to a small number of factors . . . . This narrow
cognitive focus might be sensible . . . . Numerous studies indicate that people who rely on
simplified decisionmaking [sic] models also . . . make better decisions than if they used
complicated models.” Id. (citing Robyn M. Dawes, The Robust Beauty of Improper Linear
Models in Decision Making, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES
391, 394–95 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982)).
41. Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 452–53. “[P]sychologists have demonstrated
that people often engage in . . . ‘motivated reasoning,’ meaning that they make inferences
consistent with what they want to believe . . . [and] interpret ambiguous evidence in ways
that favor their beliefs and desires. . . . [C]onsumers usually . . . will process the terms . . . in
a way that supports their desire to complete the transaction.” Id. (citing Ziva Kunda, The
Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480, 495 (1990).
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Disposition describes the reality that people minimize the probability
that negative events will occur as a result of their contracting decisions.42
Studies show this unbridled optimism affects expectations in many other
areas as well, including driving skill, possibility of household injury,
likelihood of career success, and likelihood of marital stability.43
Disposition is also manifested in the fact that humans believe highly in
their capability for resolving difficult problems.44 Thus, disposition defects
mean that people, including consumers, take negative risks too lightly and
are too confident in their aptitude for successfully calculating the
probability of the eventual occurrence of such risks.
Defective capability describes the reality that the human mind
“systematically distort[s] the way an actor searches for, processes, and
weighs information and scenarios.”45
Defective capability actually
describes multiple faulty decision-making processes, or heuristics.46 One
such faulty heuristic is availability.47 The availability heuristic is that
people only use information immediately available to them.48 An example
is that “the subjective probability of traffic accidents rises temporarily
when one sees a car overturned by the side of the road.”49 Another faulty
42. Eisenberg, supra note 31, at 216 (citing Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism
About Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806 (1980)); see also
Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 453–54. “[P]eople commonly overestimate the
importance of adverse risks, [and] . . . underestimate adverse risks they voluntarily
undertake. . . . [including] legal obligations. . . . tend[ing] to believe that they can also safely
discount the low-probability events covered by standard terms. . . . [and] will overstate their
own ability to assess . . . reputation[s].” Id.
43. Eisenberg, supra note 31, at 216–18. The empirical evidence on domestic accidents
included findings that the overwhelming majority of consumers felt that their risk for injury
from operation of bicycles or lawn mowers was exceedingly low, and the same was true
with concerns as diverse as bleach, drain cleaner, and gas poisoning. Id. at 216–17 (citing
W. KIP VISCUSI & WESLEY A. MAGAT, LEARNING ABOUT RISK: CONSUMER AND WORKER
RESPONSES TO HAZARD INFORMATION 94–95 (1987)). With respect to life achievements, the
great majority of college students surveyed felt extremely optimistic about their prospects
for eventual home ownership, avoidance of alcohol problems, job satisfaction, and marital
stability. Id. at 217 (citing Weinstein, supra note 42, at 809–14)).
44. Id. (citing Ward Edwards & Detlof von Winterfeldt, Cognitive Illusions and Their
Implications for the Law, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 225, 239 (1986)).
45. Id. at 218.
46. Id. (citing Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of
Decisions, 59 J. BUS. S251, S251 (Supp. 1986)); see also Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note
6, at 450–51. With “limited cognitive resources with which to assess the risks associated
with a contract[,] . . . [consumers] rely on mental shortcuts or rules of thumb to guide
complex decisions about risks . . . lead[ing] people to worry too much about risks in some
circumstances, and not enough about risks in others.” Id.
47. Eisenberg, supra note 31, at 220.
48. Id. at 220–22.
49. Id. at 221 (citing Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 40, at
1127).
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heuristic is representativeness, which is that people make decisions in
reliance on a non-representative sample of information that they incorrectly
deem adequate.50 Yet another flawed heuristic is faulty telescopic faculties.
This comes into play when people place too much weight on immediate
costs and benefits and too little weight on future costs and benefits.51 The
fourth flawed heuristic in Eisenberg’s article is the presence of faulty riskestimation faculties. This is similar to the disposition limitation previously
discussed, because it describes the reality that people tend to underestimate
risks.52 Statistical evidence reveals that most people do not take such
perceived low risks into account in their decision-making.53
It is readily apparent that the defects in cognitive capability that
Eisenberg describes have major implications for the problem of consumer
form contracts.54 Most of the eventualities addressed by boilerplate form
terms are unlikely to occur in the vast majority of cases. As such, the
various cognitive limitations are applicable to consumers’ consideration of
such contract terms, including bounded rationality (they will ignore many
of the terms since they cannot fully process them or the eventualities they
address); disposition and underestimation of risks (they will be unduly
optimistic about anything bad happening to them in the future); and giving
undue weight to present benefits and costs as opposed to those which will
pertain in the future.55 As Eisenberg articulated:
The bottom line is simple: The verbal and legal obscurity of
preprinted terms renders the cost of searching out and
deliberating on these terms exceptionally high. In contrast, the
low probability of these nonperformance terms’ coming into play
heavily discounts the benefits of search and deliberation.
Furthermore, the length and complexity of form contracts is often
not correlated to the dollar value of the transaction. Where form
contracts involve a low dollar value of performance, the cost of
thorough search and deliberation on preprinted terms, let alone
the cost of legal advice about the meaning and effect of the terms,
will usually be prohibitive in relation to the benefits. Faced with
preprinted terms whose effect the [consumer] knows he will find
difficult or impossible to fully understand, which involve risks
that probably will never mature, which are unlikely to be worth
50. Id. at 222.
51. Id. “For example, a major rationale for mandatory and voluntary but tax-favored
pension programs is that most people lack the foresight to adequately save for retirement
because of faulty telescopic faculties.” Id. (citing Martin Feldstein, The Optimal Level of
Social Security Benefits, 100 Q.J. ECON. 303, 303, 307 (1985)).
52. Id. at 223.
53. Id. (citing Howard Kunreuther & Paul Slovic, Economics, Psychology, and
Protective Behavior, AM. ECON. REV., May 1978 (papers & proceedings), at 64, 66–67).
54. Id. at 240.
55. Id. at 240–41.
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the cost of search and processing, and which probably aren’t
subject to revision in any event, a rational [consumer] will
typically decide to remain ignorant of the preprinted terms.56
2.

Literacy Defects

Literacy is another important issue to consider in evaluating the
context in which consumers agree to form contracts.57 As set forth in the
previous discussion on contract law doctrine, the legal precepts involving
form contracts are primarily based on the duty to read.58 Few consumers
bother reading the form contracts they enter into, and those that try are
presumed to not understand them anyway.59 By this, commentators usually
mean that consumers are laypersons and do not possess the legal training
that would allow them to understand the meaning of contract language.60
But, the problem of understanding is even more profound than that. In a
recent journal piece entitled Literacy and Contract, Alan White and Cathy
Lesser Mansfield observe that the literacy rates in the United States are
rapidly decreasing, and a great many of the people that sign contracts have
trouble understanding the basic English in contracts, let alone the legal
terminology.61 These conclusions derive from the 1992 National Adult
Literary Survey (NALS), conducted by the U.S. Department of
Education.62 The NALS survey ascertained adult literacy into five levels—
from Level I (the lowest) to Level V (the highest).63 While the NALS
56. Id. at 243 (citing Michael I. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer Form Contract:
Law and Economics Meets the Real World, 24 GA. L. REV. 583, 600 (1990)).
57. See Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L.
& POL’Y REV. 233 (2002) (exploring empirical data and the effects of consumer literacy
with respect to contract forms).
58. John D. Calamari, Duty to Read—A Changing Concept, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 341,
342 (1974).
59. Rakoff, supra note 9, at 1179; see also Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 446.
“Reading and understanding boilerplate terms is difficult and time consuming for
consumers. Consumers recognize that they are unlikely to understand the lengthy and
complicated legal jargon in the boilerplate.” Id. (citing Eisenberg, supra note 31, at 242).
60. Meyerson, supra note 4, at 1270 (citing Commercial Union Assurance Cos. v.
Gollan, 394 A.2d 839, 841 (N.H. 1978); Storms v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 388 A.2d 578,
580 (N.H. 1978); Unico v. Owen, 232 A.2d 405, 410 (N.J. 1967); DeLancey v. Insurance
Co., 52 N.H. 581 (1873); Colin K. Kaufman, The Resurrection of Contract, 17 WASHBURN
L. J. 38, 45 (1977)).
61. See White & Mansfield, supra note 57, at 234 (noting that “[n]ew research
measuring the literacy of the U.S. population demonstrates that even consumers who might
take the time and trouble to ‘read’ contemporary consumer contract documents are unlikely
to understand them”).
62. Id. at 235.
63. Id. at 236. To explain further:
On the NALS scale, Level I for document literacy corresponds to extremely
simple tasks, such as signing one’s name on a social security card, or locating a
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survey does not expressly concern form contracts, it does deal with a type
of writing of arguably similar sophistication—namely, consumer credit
disclosures.64 These disclosures were found to require Level V literacy,
which the NALS study attributed to merely three percent of adults in the
United States.65 Thus, according to the NALS study, ninety-seven percent
of adults in the United States lack the capability to comprehend such
content. The NALS study articulated the disheartening implication: “The
degree of literacy required to comprehend the average disclosure form and
key contract terms simply is not within reach of the majority of American
adults.”66 Accordingly, form contract doctrine does not comport with the
ability of average adults to read and comprehend form contracts, and this
further corroborates the notion that consent in this context is conceptually
flawed.67
III. SOME EXAMPLES OF SOCIAL MEDIA USAGE BY DISAFFECTED
CONSUMERS
As set forth above, consumers enter into agreements with large
commercial enterprises almost exclusively by way of standard form
contracts. Consumers likely never read the bulk of the contracts they
signed (or to which they clicked “I agree”). Had they read the contracts,
they would likely have either not understood them, or would have made
several cognitive errors in processing the terms and making decisions about
them. And finally, even if the consumers had surmounted all of these
hurdles—that is, if they had taken the time to read the contracts, understood
them totally, and correctly decided that the terms were unfavorable and that
they would like to change them—the consumers would almost never have
been able to do so because of a complete lack of bargaining power to assert
single piece of information that is labeled explicitly on a form with no other
distracting information. Level II document tasks are only slightly more
complex, requiring the reader to locate information on row and column tables,
and to deal with similar, distracting information. Tasks at Levels III, IV, and V
require readers to use more complex tables and charts, with multiple columns
and nested structures, and numerous confusingly similar pieces of information.
For example, one Level IV task was based on a bus schedule that had different
sections for outbound and inbound service, different rows for different times
and different days of the week, and columns for various stops. From the
document, readers were asked to calculate the interval between buses on a given
day at a given place and time.
Id. (citing IRWIN S. KIRSCH ET AL., ADULT LITERACY IN AMERICA, A FIRST LOOK AT
RESULTS OF THE NATIONAL ADULT LITERACY SURVEY, at 91 (1993).
64. Id. at 237.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 239.
67. Id. at 242.

THE
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against the business entity.
Legally, all of this is relatively unchanged if contingencies
subsequently occur. Consider the example of a clause that limits the
contractual liability of a business along with a product or service,
purchased by the consumer pursuant to an unread and un-negotiated form
contract, which actually causes damages for which the consumer would
like to seek compensation against the business. At this stage of postformation disappointed expectations, just as with the initial formation of
the contract (i.e., signing or clicking), the consumer is generally powerless
to change things. The consumer is bound and lacks bargaining power. He
is likely to be directed to some low- to mid-level associate in the firm, via a
1-800 number, website, or otherwise, and told in a perfunctory manner
what the binding terms are to which the consumer previously agreed. If he
tries to argue that such an outcome was not known by him, or is otherwise
unfair, the company is completely within its legal rights to tell the
disappointed consumer: “Sorry, that is what our contract says.” Anecdotal
accounts of consumers gaining some degree of relief or mercy from such
terms of course can and do arise, but in the main the above sets out the
typical state of affairs. The consumer has no power in this scenario to
persuade the business to change its mind, other than an angry slamming
down of the telephone, and perhaps the threat that the consumer will tell a
few friends and family not to do further business with the company. The
consumer’s power, reach, and ability to exert persuasive force over the
company is obviously extremely limited.
But recently, several consumers have made use of social media tools
in order to exert pressure on the large commercial enterprises with which
they had contracted, and which had previously disappointed the consumers
by standing on contract terms which were legally binding on the consumer.
In most of these instances, the consumers had at first gone the traditional
route of personally and directly contacting company representatives, and
seeking some relief from the harsh treatment being undertaken by the
company in reliance on form contract terms. When that failed, the
consumers took their complaint to the social media, galvanizing large
amounts of attention. In all three of the instances recounted below,
consumers successfully persuaded the companies to make concessions that
they had previously been unwilling to make.
A.

Facebook

In February 2009, the social networking site Facebook quietly made
changes to its Terms of Service to which its users were required to agree in
order to continue using the site. At the beginning of that month, the
Facebook Terms of Service had included a provision that read as follows:
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You hereby grant Facebook an irrevocable, perpetual, nonexclusive, transferable, fully paid, worldwide license (with the
right to sublicense) to (a) use, copy, publish, stream, store, retain,
publicly perform or display, transmit, scan, reformat, modify,
edit, frame, translate, excerpt, adapt, create derivative works and
distribute (through multiple tiers), any User Content you (i) Post
on or in connection with the Facebook Service or the promotion
thereof subject only to your privacy settings or (ii) enable a user
to Post, including by offering a Share Link on your website and
(b) to use your name, likeness and image for any purpose,
including commercial or advertising, each of (a) and (b) on or in
connection with the Facebook Service or the promotion thereof.
You may remove your User Content from the Site at any time. If
you choose to remove your User Content, the license granted
above will automatically expire, however you acknowledge that
the Company may retain archived copies of your User Content.68
Facebook changed the above license by removing the last two
italicized sentences.69 This change had the effect of giving Facebook
ownership of all images and material posted to Facebook, even after a user
decided to cancel his account or remove content which had previously been
posted (i.e., photos, videos, etc.).70 Or, as one website journalist put it more
colorfully: “We can do anything we want with your content. Forever.”71
Technically, Facebook’s Terms of Service provided that it would only
retain the ability to use the content in accordance with the user’s most
recent privacy settings, which would, for instance, prevent Facebook from
having the right to use the photos or other content if the user had marked it
“private.”72 Furthermore, Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg assured the
public that Facebook wouldn’t use anyone’s information in a way that they

68. Chris Walters, Facebook’s New Terms of Service: “We Can Do Anything We Want
With Your Content. Forever” THE CONSUMERIST (February 15, 2009, 11:14 PM),
http://con.st/5150175 (emphasis added).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Ryan Radia, Again, Facebook sparks controversy then bows to user pressure, THE
TECHNOLOGY LIBERATION FRONT (February 18, 2009), http://techliberation.com/2009/02/18
/again-facebook-sparks-controversy-then-bows-to-user-pressure/. As the title of the online
article indicates, the February 2009 Terms of Service controversy was not the first time that
Facebook had sparked an outcry from its members.
Back in late 2007, Facebook unveiled an advertising service called Beacon that
tracked the buying habits of Facebook users for advertising purposes. Beacon
allowed your friends to see your purchasing habits, sparking privacy concerns
and media scrutiny. After a few weeks, Facebook gave in to pressure and began
allowing users to opt-out of Beacon entirely by changing their privacy settings.
Id.
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wouldn’t want.73
But the public relations damage had been done. The changes were
immediately pointed out in an online article at The Consumerist website.74
Large numbers of Facebook users were upset over the perceived or real
threat posed by the change to Facebook’s Terms of Service.75 Several
Facebook pages were immediately created for the purpose of voicing
disapproval of Facebook’s changes to its Terms of Service, and these
pages—the equivalent of online petitions—attracted thousands of people
within hours.76 An example of one such site was a Facebook group page
entitled: “FACEBOOK OWNS YOU: Protest the New Changes to the
TOS!”77 By “liking” or “joining” such pages, Facebook members
essentially “signed” the online petition stating their disapproval of the
changes to Facebook’s Terms of Service. Ironically, the very social
networking structure Facebook had created operated against them by
allowing members to exponentially share their disapproval with other
fellow members. The issue quickly made its way onto the blogosphere,
various tech websites, and even CNN.com and the Fox News Channel.78
In the face of mounting pressure from its own users, as well as the
negative media attention, Facebook relented. Specifically, it announced
that it was reverting back to the immediately previous version of its Terms
of Use—that is, essentially putting back into the content license the
sentences which appeared to give users the ability to terminate the license
by removing the content from the Facebook site.79 Facebook’s reversion to
its older Terms of Service was accompanied by a reassuring post from
Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg, conveying the message that there was
never an intent to do anything unsavory or unwanted.80 Even more,
Facebook decided to pull back the curtain and created the “Facebook Bill
of Rights and Responsibilities,” which was designed to solicit input on
what the Terms of Service should be, and what was and was not acceptable
use by Facebook.81

73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. FACEBOOK OWNS YOU: Protest the New Changes to the TOS!, FACEBOOK,
http://www.facebook.com/groups/50848058709/ (last visited May 2, 2011).
78. See Radia, supra note 72.
79. Id.
80. See Update on Terms, FACEBOOK BLOG (February 18, 2009, 1:17 AM),
http://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?post=54746167130.
81. Facebook
Bill
of
Rights
and
Responsibilities,
FACEBOOK,
http://www.facebook.com/groups/69048030774/ (last visited May 2, 2011).
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Ryan Radia wrote an article describing the controversy for The
Technology Liberation Front, an online blog.82 He noted that “especially
on the Web, companies have little choice but to listen to their users, and
firms often find that they can’t get away with unsavory practices that might
have flown under the radar in another era without spurring user backlash
and, worse still, bad PR.”83 Radia reported that, had Facebook not
promptly given in to user demand, there was a looming possibility that
complaints would have been filed with the Federal Trade Commission.84
There was even a possibility that Congress would have commenced an
investigation of social networking and licensing practices:
But as the user uprising and Facebook’s quick reaction illustrate,
markets are perfectly capable of resolving many kinds of disputes
quickly and efficiently. Regulators are the dinosaurs of the
digital era. Even if the FTC had acted on EPIC’s planned
complaint, any regulatory ruling probably would not have
emerged until long after the fiasco had been resolved—either by
Facebook relenting, or by users ditching Facebook for a
competing social network.
We’ll never know what would have happened had Facebook
held firm, but if history is any guide, keeping regulators at bay
may well have been a wise move on Facebook’s part.85
Thus, the consumer backlash and media attention that followed
Facebook’s initial change of its Terms of Service in February 2009 caused
Facebook to relent and make term changes that were perceived as more
favorable to its users. This was twenty-first century online consumer
pressure on a large commercial entity that, perhaps in a prior era, would not
have needed to capitulate. But because of the collective persuasive power
of the thousands of Facebook users who voiced their displeasure, Facebook
was prevailed upon to change its terms. Facebook users scored a win and
an ostensible “democratization” of the Facebook form contract Terms of
Service.
B.

Bank of America

In 2009, Ann Minch was one of millions of customers with Bank of
America credit card accounts.86 Although never made clear in either Ms.
82. Ryan Radia is Associate Director of the Center for Technology and Innovation at
the Competitive Enterprise Institute. Radia, supra note 72.
83. Id.
84. Id. Radia reported that the Electronic Privacy Information Center was the
organization that had been preparing a complaint to file with the FTC. Id.
85. Id.
86. Lee Ferran, Woman Boycotts Bank of America, Wins, ABCNEWS.COM (Sept. 28,
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Minch’s Internet postings or the media accounts of her dealings with Bank
of America, her contract with Bank of America almost certainly contained
a clause that gave wide discretion to the bank to unilaterally raise the
interest rate on the card for a number of different reasons. For example,
Bank of America’s current credit card agreement contains the following
term:
WE MAY AMEND THIS AGREEMENT
We may amend this Agreement at any time. We may amend it
by adding, deleting, or changing provisions of this Agreement.
We may increase or decrease any or all of your APRs, including
any Promotional APRs. When we amend this Agreement we will
comply with the applicable notice requirements of federal and
Delaware law that are in effect at that time.
The reasons we may change the terms of this Agreement include
the following: your risk profile based on your payment patterns,
transaction patterns, balance patterns, and utilization levels of
this and other accounts, credit bureau information including the
age, history and type of other accounts, and relationships
between each and all of these measures of risk. We may also
change terms for reasons not related to your individual credit
history, such as overall economic and market trends, product
design, and business needs.87

2009),
http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/woman-boycotts-bank-america-wins/story?id=8688
175.
87. This language was pulled from the current Visa Signature World MasterCard
agreement form that Bank of America provided to the Federal Reserve Bank, with the
language being current as of December 31, 2010. Bank of America Corp., Credit Card
Agreement, FEDERALRESERVE.GOV (Dec. 30, 2010), http://www.federalreserve.gov/
CreditCardAgreementsContent/creditcardagreement_3559.txt. Whether the credit card
agreement terms that governed Ann Minch’s account with Bank of America were
substantially similar to those cited herein is not critical for purposes of the anecdotal
illustration and purposes of this Article. It is worth noting, however, that in 2009 Congress
passed The Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009. Pub. L.
No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (2009). Among other things, the Act provides that:
[R]etroactive interest rate hikes on existing balances are banned, except when:
•An introductory or ‘teaser’ period ends.
•The interest rate is tied to an index and is variable.
•The card user completes the terms of a workout plan for debt repayment
or fails to comply with terms of a workout plan.
•The card user is more than 60 days late making a monthly payment. The
card issuer must give the reason for the increase and must restore the
interest rate to the previous, lower level after six months if the
cardholder has made on-time payments during that six-month period.
•Military service members end active duty. Federal law caps credit card
APRs for service members at 6 percent as long as they are on active
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This term was almost certainly unbeknownst to Minch when she first
entered into the agreement with Bank of America.
The term, and Bank of America’s willingness to invoke it, became
clear when the bank apparently notified Minch that it was raising her
interest rate from 12.99% to 30%.88 Minch says that when she first
received the notice of the increased interest rate, she called Bank of
America in order to complain, but her initial efforts were not successful in
persuading the bank to change its mind.89 In short, her bargaining power at
this post-formation stage of her disappointed expectations was basically
zero.
Minch decided to try another tactic, and on September 8, 2009, she
posted a YouTube videotaped diatribe she entitled “DEBTORS REVOLT
STARTS NOW!”90 Stating that she could get “better rates from a loan
shark” and that she was “making a stand,” she recounts her unsuccessful
efforts to contact Bank of America and work out her complaint privately.
She then goes on to state in the video:
Well, I’ve thought about it, and now I have a message to Bank of
America, and to all the big banks who are robbing our current
middle class citizens and robbing our children and grandchildren
of any hope of a middle class standard of living in their future.
So here goes. You are evil, thieving bastards. You have reaped
ungodly profits in your behemoth casino scams, then lost, only to
turn around and usurp the wealth of this great nation by the
duty. The Federal Reserve Board added a provision that allows
credit card issuers to increase interest rates on cards owned by
service members to restore APRs to previous levels.
Connie Prater & Tyler Metzger, A Guide to the Credit CARD Act of 2009,
CREDITCARDS.COM (Feb. 3, 2010), http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/creditcard-law-interactive-1282.php.
88. Ann Minch, DEBTORS REVOLT BEGINS NOW!, YOUTUBE (Sept. 8, 2009),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jGC1mCS4OVo. Minch’s YouTube ID is apparently
“Rockerchic4God.” Id.; see also Ferran, supra note 86.
89. Minch, supra note 88. Specifically, Minch reported:
For fourteen years, I’ve been a Bank of America customer. I’ve had two BofA
credit cards, one of them paid off, another carrying a balance. I wasn’t over the
limit, nor behind in payments. In fact, my credit is good and even though I’ve
been laid off I’ve had no trouble paying my bills. Recently, Bank of America
jacked up my interest rate on the credit card to a whopping 30%. 30% APR! I
could get a better rate from a loan shark. Well, I followed the advice of the
finance gurus you see on TV, who say that if you call the company you can
negotiate a better rate. I did call Bank of America, and they weren’t willing to
negotiate anything; in fact, they referred me to a credit counseling and debt
consolidation service. I don’t have any trouble with my budget. Basically,
Bank of America’s message to me was, “Tough shit.”
Id. at 0:22–1:24.
90. Id.
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outright rape and pillage of middle class Americans whose sweat
and toil built it. The biggest rip-off in the history of the world is
padding your bonus checks with the federal government as your
co-conspirators. Every last one of you should be rotting in
prison.
Well, I’m here to tell you, BofA, I officially notify you, Ken
Lay,91 that I’m staging a debtor’s revolt, right here, right now,
and thereby refuse to pay you one more red cent on your 30%
credit card account. This is called civil disobedience.
Now, these are my terms. Unless you return my interest rate
and monthly installment amount to what it was before the rate
hike, or, you make me a too-good-to-turn-down payoff offer,
you’re not getting another penny out of me. Had you left well
enough alone, I would have continued to make my payments in
good faith. But no, you had to bend me over for no good reason
other than papering over your mega screw-up. You can send all
the collection agencies after me that you want. You can call me
fifty times a day if you want. I don’t own any real estate, I don’t
own any real assets, I don’t even have a permanent job right now;
and even if I did, you’d have to get a court order to garnish my
wages. And considering how many people are defaulting on
your credit card accounts right now, the civil courts are going to
be backed up for years—years! You can ruin my credit, but the
banks aren’t loaning money anyway, so, the way I figure it, Mr.
Lay,92 I’ve got nothing to lose. So stick that in your bailout pipe
and smoke it.
And to my fellow citizen debtors, you must make your own
personal decision about whether to join me in this debtor’s revolt.
You will have to search your own soul to know whether it’s right
for you to take a stand, and be willing to sacrifice your credit
score to stop this outright financial rape. There’s power in
numbers, so make your own video to your creditors, write a
letter, or simply tell the bill collectors who call you to “stick it.”

91. Ms. Minch probably meant to refer to Ken Lewis, the CEO of Bank of America at
the time. This correction is noted at timestamp 2:21–2:26. Id.; see also Arthur Delaney,
Debtor’s Revolt: Woman Refuses to Pay Off Bank of America Credit Card, THE
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Jan.
19,
2010,
3:11
PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/09/14/debtors-revolt-woman-refu_n_285394.html.
Minch was apparently confused about the fact that Ken Lay was the founder of Enron, not
the CEO of Bank of America, and also further about the fact that Lay died in 2006. See,
e.g., Carrie Johnson, Enron’s Lay Dies of Heart Attack, WASH. POST, July 6, 2006, at A1.
92. Minch, supra note 88, at 2:21–2:26, 3:40–3:43.
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But I hope you’ll join me in this fight. There comes a time when
we must make a stand, and my time is now.”93
The video quickly caught a lot of attention, especially when it was
picked up by several noteworthy blogs, and eventually even some media
outlets including Good Morning America and Fox and Friends.94 Within
three weeks, it had gone “viral,” having been viewed over 300,000 times on
YouTube.95 As of May 2011, that number had increased to over half a
million viewings.96
Eleven days after posting her initial video on YouTube (and even
fewer days after it began to attract national media attention), on September
19, 2009, Ann Minch posted a follow up video on YouTube entitled
“DEBTORS UPDATE: BANK OF AMERICA RESPONDS!!!”97 In her
video, she reported that she had been contacted by a Senior Vice President
at Bank of America who talked to her about her situation, and in fact, after
they discussed Minch’s perceptions about the abuse of the banking system,
the Vice President eventually agreed to reduce Minch’s interest rate back to
12.99%.98 Although the Vice President initially proposed a new rate of
16.99%, in her second video Minch said that she refused, and that “I
believe that because you guys are getting your money from the Fed at 0%
interest or, at the most, 0.25, [and] that 12.99% is a more than generous
profit margin for you guys.”99 For its part, in response to media inquiries,
93. Id. at 1:24–4:28.
94. See Delaney, supra note 91; Woman Declares War on Bank and Wins!, YOUTUBE
(Sept. 28, 2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6qut8_2IEbw. Minch said in her
follow-up video posted on YouTube that she had appeared live on the Fox News Channel
program Fox and Friends, as well as conducted radio interviews with MSNBC and CBS
radio. See Ann Minch, DEBTORS UPDATE: BANK OF AMERICA RESPONDS!!!,
YOUTUBE (Sept. 19, 2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cNHd-GBZGQo [hereinafter
Minch, Debtors Update].
95. See Ferran, supra note 86.
96. Minch, supra note 88.
97. See Minch, Debtors Update, supra note 94.
98. Id.; see also Arthur Delaney, Debtor’s Revolt: Woman Refuses to Pay Off Bank of
America
Credit
Card,
THE
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Sept.
14,
2009),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/09/14/debtors-revolt-woman-refu_n_285394.html;
Ferran, supra note 86. In her second video, Minch was still waiting on written confirmation
from the Vice President regarding the 12.99% interest rate when a monthly statement was
received showing the rate to be 23.99%. As Minch said in her second video:
Now what’s interesting is, is I just recently got an email today, online statement
notification for that account; so, when I pulled it up on the screen, it’s showing
an APR of 23.99%, so I don’t know what BofA is doing, I don’t know if they
know if the right hand knows what the left hand is doing. So, we’ll wait to see
what happens; I’ll look for Mr. Crawford’s correspondence in the mail that he
agreed to send me.
Minch, Debtors Update, supra note 94, at 3:05–3:39.
99. Id. at 2:29–2:56.
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Bank of America confirmed in general terms that a resolution had been
reached with Minch, without giving specifics, saying only that “based on
additional information we received about her situation, we reached a
mutually agreeable resolution.”100
It is arguable that situations like Minch’s will produce little long-term
benefit to consumers on any large scale. “In a world where the Intertubes
can make you someone and no one in one day’s news cycle, it’s likely
Minch’s revolt will end without a bang. Banks will continue to raise rates,
slash credit limits and close accounts, and people will live with it.”101
However, that is not necessarily the point. The point is that, in general, any
consumer complaint could be voiced online in the social media and at any
moment it could go viral and force the company to respond. In Arthur
Delaney’s follow-up post on the story in The Huffington Post, he related an
email he had received from Ed Mierzwinski, program director of the U.S.
Public Interest Research Group:
Historically, powerful and arrogant corporations, often protected
by lazy regulators, have ignored consumer complaints—now
social media tools are leveling the playing field for victimized
consumers . . . . The old web 1.0 mybanksucks.com sites that no
one found are being replaced with realtime [sic] viral outrage that
will require big business to start treating consumers more fairly
or pay the price.102
The mere possibility of it at least raises the specter of some increase in
bargaining power. This “real-time viral outrage” that Bank of America
experienced at the hands of Ann Minch, resulted in her achieving a much
larger amount of power and bargained-for result than she surely would
have received absent her use of the social media.
C.

United Airlines

Dave Carroll is a Canadian musician who is in a band called the Sons
of Maxwell. The band purchased tickets from United Airlines to fly on
March 31, 2008 from Halifax to Omaha, Nebraska, with one stop to change
planes in Chicago at O’Hare International Airport.103 Carroll and his bandmates, like all passengers on United Airlines, agreed in buying their tickets
to the terms contained in the United Airlines Contract of Carriage,
100. Ferran, supra note 86.
101. Tyler Metzger, Ann Minch Declares Debtors’ Revolt; Not All Follow, TAKING
CHARGE (A CREDITCARDS.COM BLOG) (Sept. 30, 2009), http://blogs.creditcards.com/2009/
09/ann-minch-debtors-revolt.php.
102. Delaney, supra note 98, at 2.
103. Dave Carroll, Story, DAVE CARROLL MUSIC, http://www.davecarrollmusic.com
/ubg/story/ (last visited May 4, 2011).
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available for viewing on United’s website.104 Presumably unread and
unbeknownst to Carroll, that form contract language, which United treated
as agreed to by him, contained a provision that would come back to haunt
him in his subsequent dispute with United. Specifically, “Rule 0095” in
the carriage contract provides in part:
No action shall be maintained for any loss of, or damage to, or
any delay in the delivery of any baggage, or on any other claim
(excepting only personal injury or death), arising out of or in
connection with transportation of, or failure to transport any
baggage unless the claim is reported to UA within 24 hrs.105
The Sons of Maxwell boarded the United Airlines flight in Halifax on
March 31 and checked their musical instruments on the plane in the
baggage department, including Carroll’s 710 Taylor guitar.106 When they
landed in Chicago, they were waiting to get off the plane when another
passenger shouted out: “My god they’re throwing guitars out there.”107
Carroll and his bass player Mike looked outside the plane just in time to see
their instruments “being heaved without regard by the United baggage
handlers.”108
Carroll immediately tried to talk to the flight attendant inside the
plane, who told him to talk to the “lead agent” outside.109 The lead agent
refused to talk to him.110 A United employee at the gate told him “that’s
why we make you sign the waiver” (though Carroll says he signed no
waiver) and in any event to contact United personnel in Omaha once he

104. United Airlines Contract of Carriage, UNITED AIR LINES, INC. (Mar 9, 2011) (on file
with author). The first sentence of the carriage contract states:
This contract of carriage sets forth the terms and conditions on which UA
provides air transportation to passengers and their baggage on flights UA
operates, whether such air transportation is purchased from UA, one of UA’s
agents or from another carrier. The rules contained in this contract of carriage
are expressly agreed to by the passenger.
Id. at 2.
105. Id. at 14 (emphasis added). The twenty-four hour rule cited is stated in United
Airline’s carriage contract to be the rule applicable for domestic flights. The contract
provides a lengthier seven-day period for notice in the event of international flights. Id. at
13. Apparently United always maintained that the twenty-four hour rule applied in Carroll’s
case, for whatever reason. The carriage contract also provides that United will not be
responsible for damage to certain defined “fragile items” unless they are appropriately
packaged for the flight; United further defined “fragile items” to include musical
instruments and guitars particularly. Id. at 26–27. However, it does not appear that this
provision was ever asserted by United as an additional reason to deny Carroll’s claim.
106. Carroll, supra note 103.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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reached his final destination.111 Carroll arrived at Omaha at 12:30 a.m. and
no United employees were visibly present.112 Carroll did not look at his
guitar then, but instead discovered it was badly damaged the next day at a
sound check for the band’s first show.113 He was not able to return to
Omaha for seven days until the string of concert dates was over, but when
he returned to the Omaha airport he was told to make a claim for the
damage at the Halifax airport, which was the point of origin.114 When he
got back home, the Halifax airport personnel diverted him elsewhere. So
began a circular customer service nightmare for Carroll that lasted several
months, involving phone calls and e-mail correspondence to multiple
offices of United Airlines and Air Canada in Halifax, Chicago, India, and
New York. It ended with a denial of his claim (the guitar was repaired for
$1200) for several reasons, including the fact that the damage was not
reported upon his arrival at the Omaha airport or within twenty-four hours
thereafter, in accordance with United’s terms.115
It occurred to Carroll that he “had been fighting a losing battle all this
time and that fighting over this at all was a waste of time. The system is
designed to frustrate affected customers into giving up their claims.”116 But
then he hit upon the idea to write a song about it. He told Ms. Irlweg from
United that he would write not one, not two, but three songs about the
whole experience with United Airlines, complete with professionally
produced videos, and would put them on YouTube for free.117 His goal was
to reach one million “hits” in a year, so that a large audience would see the
way that United Airlines had treated Carroll.118

111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. The final email exchange occurred with a United employee named “Ms.
Irlweg,” who Carroll said gave the following reasons for the denial of his claim:
• I didn’t report it to the United employees who weren’t present when we landed
in Omaha
• I didn’t report to the Omaha airport within 24 hours while I was driving to
places that weren’t Omaha
• It was an Air Canada issue
• Air Canada already denied the claim (as I mentioned because Air Canada
would not pay for United’s damages), but I’m still unsure as to why I needed to
report it in Omaha within 24 hours if it was clearly Halifax’s responsibility
• Someone from United would need to see the damage to a guitar that was
repaired
Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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And so Carroll wrote the song “United Breaks Guitars,” and uploaded
a professional video of the song to YouTube on July 6, 2009.119 The song
is quite catchy, very light-hearted, and clever. The lyrics to the song
colorfully describe the episode and Carroll’s sentiment:
I flew United Airlines on my way to Nebraska
The plane departed, Halifax, connecting in Chicago’s “O’Hare.”
While on the ground, a passenger said from the seat behind me,
“My God, they’re throwing guitars out there”
The band and I exchanged a look, best described as terror
At the action on the tarmac, and knowing whose projectiles these
would be
So before I left Chicago, I alerted three employees
Who showed complete indifference towards me
Chorus
United . . . (United . . .)
You broke my Taylor Guitar
United . . . (United . . .)
Some big help you are
You broke it, you should fix it
You’re liable, just admit it
I should’ve flown with someone else
Or gone by car
‘Cause United breaks guitars.
When we landed in Nebraska, I confirmed what I’d suspected
My Taylor’d been the victim of a vicious act of malice at O’Hare
So began a year-long saga, of “Pass the buck,” “Don’t ask me,”
and “I’m sorry, sir, your claim can go nowhere.”
So to all the airlines people, from New York to New Delhi
Including kind Ms. Irlweg, who says the final word from them is
“no.”
I heard all your excuses,
119. Dave Carroll, United Breaks Guitars,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5YGc4zOqozo.

YOUTUBE

(July

6,

2009),
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And I’ve chased your wild gooses
And this attitude of yours, I say, must go
(Repeat chorus)
Well, I won’t say that I’ll never fly with you again,
‘Cause, maybe, to save the world, I probably would,
But that won’t likely happen,
And if it did, I wouldn’t bring my luggage
‘Cause you’d just go and break it,
Into a thousand pieces,
Just like you broke my heart
When United breaks guitars.
(Repeat chorus)120
The song quickly found an audience, and went viral. The video
generated nearly four million hits in the first ten days.121 Within four
months it had generated over 5.8 million hits.122 As of May 2011, the
number of hits was over 10.3 million.123 Carroll’s story attracted the
attention of the national and international print and television media.124 It
120. Id.; Sons of Maxwell, United Breaks Guitars Lyrics, LYRICSMODE,
http://www.lyricsmode.com/lyrics/s/sons_of_maxwell/united_breaks_guitars.html
(last
visited May 4, 2011). Carroll eventually released two more songs to complete his promised
“United” trilogy. See Dave Carroll, United Breaks Guitars Song 2, YOUTUBE (Aug. 17,
2009), http://www.youtube.com/user/sonsofmaxwell#p/u/1/h-UoERHaSQg; Dave Caroll,
United Breaks Guitars Song 3: ‘United We Stand’ on the Right Side of Right, YOUTUBE
(Mar. 1, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/user/sonsofmaxwell#p/u/0/P45E0uGVyeg. As of
May 4, 2011, Song 2 had generated over 1.2 million hits and Song 3 had generated over
350,000 hits.
121. Eddie Wrenn, The Sweet Music of Revenge: Singer Pens YouTube Hit After United
Airlines Breaks His Guitar . . . And Shares Plunge 10%, DAILY MAIL (July 24, 2009, 8:12
AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/worldnews/article-1201671/Singer-Dave-Carrollpens-YouTube-hit-United-Airlines-breaks-guitar--shares-plunge-10.html.
122. Christine Negroni, With Video, a Traveler Fights Back, NEW YORK TIMES, Oct. 29,
2009, at B1.
123. United Breaks Guitars, supra note 119.
124. See, e.g., CBS News Online, Singer’s Sweet Revenge, YOUTUBE (July 10, 2009),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V0ophSWaRSQ; gerrior99, United Breaks Guitars –
CNN
Situation
Room
–
Wolf
Blitzer,
YOUTUBE
(July
9,
2009),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-QDkR-Z-69Y; Ryan McCarthy, ‘United Breaks
Guitars’ Singer Gets Cash Offer from Airline, HUFFINGTON POST (August 8, 2009),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/07/08/united-breaks-guitars-pas_n_228062.html;
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was even speculated to have been the cause of a 10% decline in the value
of United Airlines stock—an amount worth $180 million—which occurred
in the days following the posting of Carroll’s video.125
In the face of the negative publicity, United Airlines contacted Carroll
in order to resolve the matter.126 Specifically, they offered to pay him the
money for his repair costs and to give him vouchers for future flights on
United Airlines.127 Interestingly, Carroll declined the offer and requested
that United donate the amount to charity instead (although, of course, it
should be noted that all of the publicity from the video and the incident
almost certainly helped Carroll’s album sales).128 A United spokesperson
acknowledged the powerful effect of Carroll’s usage of social media in this
instance, stating that “[w]e understand the power of social media and the
implications it has on our reputation, and realize it has a role in our
communicating to our guests and the public at large.”129 In fact, United
Airlines appears to have acknowledged the poor customer service on its
part with respect to Carroll’s claim, and has even stated that it plans to
incorporate the video into its employees’ customer service training in the
future.130
IV. SOME IMPLICATIONS OF CONSUMERS’ USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA FOR
FORM CONTRACT RELIEF
In prior eras the Facebook accountholders, as well as people like Ann
Minch and Dave Carroll, would not have been nearly as likely to have
obtained the results they did by utilizing social media to voice their
complaints. These consumers had signed or otherwise agreed to the form
contracts accompanying the services they received. Before the advent of

Negroni, supra note 122; Christopher Reynolds, Smashed Guitar, YouTube Song—United is
Listening Now, LOS ANGELES TIMES (July 7, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jul
/07/travel/la-tr-smash-guitar-united-07072009; Wrenn, supra note 121; The Economist, Did
Dave Carroll Lose United Airlines $180m?, GULLIVER BUSINESS TRAVEL (July 24, 2009,
10:32 AM), http://www.economist.com/node/20024421.
125. See Wrenn, supra note 121 (“The company has lost 10[%] of their share value—a
massive $180 million—after being blamed for damaging a musician’s guitar.”). But see The
Economist, supra note 124 (sarcastically stating “[t]hat’s right folks. United’s share-price
plunge is all attributable to Dave Carroll”).
126. See Brandon Walker, Dave Carroll Wins War with United Airlines: Company Says
it Will Compensate Musician for Breaking Guitar, THE DAILY PRESS (Mar. 27, 2010),
available at www.thedailypress.ca/ArticleDisplay.aspx?e=1647542.
127. Wrenn, supra note 121.
128. Id.
129. United Airlines’ Higgins: guitar blunder ‘made terrific fodder for a video,
ELLIOTT.ORG (Aug. 14, 2009), http://www.elliott.org/first-person/united-airlines-higginsguitar-blunder-made-terrific-fodder-for-a-video/.
130. Wrenn, supra note 121.
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social media, Ms. Minch would perhaps have called Bank of America’s 1800 number to complain about the mailed notice of a raised interest rate,
but would have relied solely on the hope that she caught a bank employee
on a good day so that she could be the random recipient of a concession—
there would be no power she could assert in such discussions, but rather
she would be completely at the mercy of whether the bank, acting through
its representatives, would choose to extend leniency not required by its
form contract. The same would have been true for Mr. Carroll. In eras
past, United’s decision to deny his claim for failure to timely notify and
document it would be unassailable, and Carroll would have no power to
wield against United, in order to get it to relent in the enforcement of its
claims policies. All of these consumers assented to form contracts, which
allowed the companies to act in the manner they initially did. Absent the
consumers’ use of social media, it appears that those initial decisions would
have remained final.
However, the Facebook protesters of February 2009, Ann Minch, and
Dave Carroll were all able to obtain post-formation concessions from their
behemoth corporate contracting partners. They exerted bargaining pressure
against the companies by using social media technology that scarcely
existed until a few years ago. The potential implications are interesting,
insofar as they could herald at least some correction to the vastly uneven
playing field that currently exists between consumers and their corporate
contracting partners, a correction that would be a welcome development.
For although Henry Maine famously observed in the nineteenth century
that “the movement of progressive societies has hitherto been a movement
from status to contract,”131 in the early twentieth century it was feared that
the rise of standard form contracts and unequal bargaining power would
gradually operate to return us to a state of affairs which is more “status”based than based on principles of freedom of contract:
Standard contracts in particular could thus become effective
instruments in the hands of powerful industrial and commercial
overlords enabling them to impose a new feudal order of their
own making upon a vast host of vassals. This spectacle is all the
more fascinating since not more than a hundred years ago
contract ideology had been successfully used to break down the
last vestiges of a patriarchal and benevolent feudal order in the
field of master and servant. Thus the return back from contract to
status which we experience today was greatly facilitated by the
fact that the belief in freedom of contract has remained one of the
firmest axioms in the whole fabric of the social philosophy of our
culture.132
131. HENRY J.S. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 96 (Gaunt 1999) (1861).
132. Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of
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As observed in Part II of this Article, these fears have largely come to
pass, given the now ubiquitous nature and use of form contracts in
consumer transactions. Therefore, any incremental recapture of bargaining
power for the use of individual consumers would surely serve to create
better agreements, better products and services, and a better marketplace.
In this section, the Article will make two primary observations about
the positive effect of the consumers’ usages of social media described in
Part III. First, the level of cognitive dealings between the consumer and the
merchant are superior when the dealings occur at the point of postformation disappointed expectations, as opposed to the level of cognitive
dealings that occur at the formation stage of the contractual relationship.
Second, the bargaining power exerted by consumers at the post-formation
disappointed expectations stage is much higher than it is at the formation
stage, or even at the traditional post-formation disappointed expectations
stage, when there is effective use of social media which attracts a great deal
of attention. This results in more cost-effective contractual remedies or
concessions for the consumer than expensive and inefficient litigation
against the merchants with whom they contract.
A.

Improved Cognitive Dealing

As discussed in Part II, the law of form contracts is governed by the
duty to read—that is, consumers are bound by the terms of the contract
they sign whether they actually read them or not.133 In fact, consumers
basically do not bother to read the bulk of the language in form contracts.134
This has been a source of great consternation to contract law academics,
because it conflicts with the ideal notion of two contracting parties who
have full cognizance of the range of all contractual terms being discussed
in the negotiation.135 To illustrate this point at the formation stage with the
anecdotes discussed in Part III, Ann Minch probably did not read the fine
print in her Bank of America credit card contract that allowed the bank to
raise her interest rate to thirty percent at the time she initially entered into
the agreement.136 So, she likely never even thought about that issue and
whether the eventuality of Bank of America raising her interest rate in the
future might ever arise, in agreeing to be bound by the contract. The same
Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 640–41 (1943) (citation omitted); see also Nathan Isaacs,
The Standardizing of Contracts, 27 YALE L.J. 34 (1917).
133. Rakoff, supra note 9, at 1185 (noting that “it is legally irrelevant whether the
[consumer] actually read the contents of the document, or understood them, or subjectively
assented to them”).
134. Id. at 1179.
135. Id. at 1216 (stating that “[d]eeply embedded within the law of contracts, viewed as
private law, lies the image of individuals meeting in the marketplace . . . ”).
136. See supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text.
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is almost also assuredly true with respect to Dave Carroll and his ticket
agreement with United Airlines.137 He surely never read—and thus did not
think about at the time he purchased his airline ticket—the provisions that
limited his ability to make a claim against United in the event of any
damages to his luggage and musical instruments.
However, this lack of subjective awareness was certainly no longer
true once the consumers were faced with the disappointed expectations that
came to pass under the performance of their contracts. In the case of Ms.
Minch, once the letter from Bank of America arrived proposing to increase
her rate to 30%, this was no longer an unknown eventuality. It was staring
her in the face and was at the forefront of her mind.138 And the same was
true once Dave Carroll realized his guitar was damaged, and that United
Airlines was asserting that it would not pay, based on the inadequacy and
un-timeliness of his claim under the terms of United’s carriage contract.139
At this point, the contract clauses, which at the time of formation were
buried in the fine print and not even in the consumers’ conscious mind,
became issues of which they were now acutely aware. It is said that
nothing concentrates the mind so wonderfully as the hangman’s noose,140
and this principle also has some import within this context of unfavorable
contract terms being asserted against a consumer who was theretofore
subjectively unaware of their presence. Once the knowledge of the term—
the power to raise interest rates or deny baggage claims—is at the forefront,
then and only then is the consumer dealing with the merchant on that point
with the factual knowledge and realization which comports with the
paradigmatic ideal of dickering parties in the marketplace, hashing out all
of the terms of the deal.141 The parties at this point are dealing with true,
subjective realization of what is at stake, and thus the cognition is far
superior to that which occurs at the formation stage when the consumer
does not read and thus is not aware of the term which will eventually be
enforced by the merchant.
To go even further, there are far superior cognitive dealings at the
post-formation disappointed expectations phase, even in the relatively rare
situations where a consumer has read the particular boilerplate term at the
time of formation. Recall from Part II.B of this Article that consumers
137. See supra notes 103–05 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 107–15 and accompanying text.
140. Steven J. Dwyer, Leonard J. Feldman & Robert G. Nylander, Effective Oral
Argument: Six Pitches, Five Do’s, and Five Don’ts from One Judge and Two Lawyers, 33
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 347, 353 (2010). “[W]hen a man knows he is to be hanged in a
fortnight, it concentrates his mind wonderfully . . . .” Id. (quoting James Boswell, The Life
of Samuel Johnson, LL.D., in GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 351 (Robert Maynard
Hutchins ed., 1952) (1791))
141. Rakoff, supra note 9, at 1216.
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have significant cognitive and psychological defects in making decisions.
The limitations of bounded rationality, disposition, defective capability,
and illiteracy may come into play when the consumer initially agrees to a
form contract.142 Ann Minch couldn’t really have understood, at the time
she initially entered into the Bank of America credit card agreement, all of
the various boilerplate terms that were in it, including the myriad of
scenarios that would contractually authorize the bank to raise her interest
rate to thirty percent in the future. Thus, it made sense for her to just focus
on the “main points” like her credit limit and her initial interest rate.143 The
same would be true of Dave Carroll, who did not dig up United Airline’s
contract of carriage and peruse it before making a ticket purchase decision.
Instead, he just focused on ticket price and perhaps time schedules.
Further, even if Minch and Carroll had focused specifically on the interest
rate raise and limited baggage claims terms, respectively, they likely would
have greatly discounted the possibility that it would affect them. This is
first because of disposition. They would be unduly optimistic about their
future affairs, and thus Minch would assume that her rate would never be
raised, and Carroll would assume that his guitar or luggage would never get
damaged (or United would not deny his claim if he ever made one).144
Second, this would be because of defective capability. The possibility of
such occurrences are greatly discounted simply because it involves future
events, as opposed to immediate issues like credit limit, initial interest rate,
ticket price, and schedule.145
But, none of these cognitive defects are relevant once the postformation disappointed stage of the dealings occurs. Once Minch received
the letter from Bank of America raising her interest rate to 30%, issues of
bounded rationality, disposition, and defective capability were rendered
moot.146 At that point, she was no longer rationally ignorant of the bank’s
ability to raise her interest rate, because the bank was presently raising it.
Similarly, Bank of America’s letter also mooted Minch’s unrealistic
optimism and failure to focus on future eventualities. At that point, the
time for forecast was over and the reality of the bank’s present enforcement
of the form contract term was upon her. The hangman’s noose was around
Minch’s neck, and at that she point she engaged the reality of the contract
term directly. The same was true once Carroll realized United Airlines had
not only damaged his guitar, but also was going to invoke a boilerplate
term to deny him compensation.147 At these points, Minch and Carroll
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

See supra notes 37–56 and accompanying text.
See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
See Eisenberg, supra note 31, at 216–18.
Id. at 218–22.
See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 107–15 and accompanying text.
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realized and were fully cognizant of the existence and reality of the form
contract terms and were finally prepared to deal with their contracting
merchants with those terms fully in mind. The ideal of bargaining parties
possessing the best information possible was finally at hand. Thus, the
negotiations that thereafter occurred were cognitively superior and
arguably produced a more just and fair result compared to a buried
boilerplate term of which the consumer was completely unaware at the time
of initial contract formation. Accordingly, the problem of faulty assent
when consumers do not initially read or properly engage form contract
terms may be solved by these post-formation dealings once the
disappointed expectations manifest themselves fully and are presented for
resolution by the parties. The achievement of this result in these
occurrences has been greatly aided by the utilization of social media.
B.

Increased Bargaining Power and Lower Remedy Costs

In the previous section, it was established that consumers have better
information and a more realistic appraisal of the stakes at issue once the
contingency occurs that brings the boilerplate term to the forefront to be
grappled with.148 In this section, I will briefly demonstrate and reiterate
that, once this greater awareness is present in the consumer’s mind, use of
the social media can greatly increase the consumer’s bargaining power in
negotiating a resolution of the issue affected by the previously unread
boilerplate term. It scarcely needs to be said that the use of social media is
an exploding phenomenon. The number of hours that the average
individual spends on various social media platforms is increasing
exponentially.149 Sites like Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, and YouTube are
all continuing to grow increasingly popular.150 Businesses are more and
more cognizant of the need to increase their online presence on social
media sites in order to maximize their business opportunities.151
148. See supra notes 133–47 and accompanying text.
149. See, e.g., Steve King, Time Spent on Social Networking Sites Exploding, SMALL
BUSINESS LABS (Jan. 25, 2010, 1:00 AM), http://www.smallbizlabs.com/2010/01/timespent-on-social-networking-sites-exploding.html (noting that between 2007 and 2009, the
time Internet users spent on social networking sites increased by eighty-two percent yearly).
150. Id.; see also Adam Ostrow, You Tube is the Top Social Media Innovation of the
Decade, MASHABLE (Dec. 22, 2009), http://mashable.com/2009/12/22/youtube-2010/ (
How does something ‘go viral’? In the case of YouTube, an enormous part of it
is the ability to embed clips anywhere, from blogs, to social networking
profiles, to the front page of popular websites. YouTube pioneered this
concept, and today, it’s a driving force behind the collective 1 billion minutes
we spend each day watching YouTube clips . . . .
). (emphasis in original).
151. See Social Media Exploding Globally, Opening New Opportunities for Businesses,
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Part III of this Article addresses three anecdotal instances where social
media was used to increase consumers’ bargaining power. When
companies change their website Terms of Service for the purposes of
contractually governing consumers’ access to their sites (i.e.,
“browsewrap”), such actions are typically adhesive in nature, insofar as the
persons accessing the site have no real bargaining power, but must rather
“take the terms or leave them” (to the extent they are even aware of them).
Emails to the webmaster listed on the site, or the other contact information,
protesting or attempting to dicker some particular term in the terms, would
be met with about as much willingness as that of the Sears salesperson
when I try to negotiate the terms of the credit agreement when buying a
refrigerator on credit. But, it is easy for companies to ignore or rebuff
single individual consumers on a one-on-one basis. It was harder for
Facebook to ignore the protests of thousands of Facebook users, when
members made plain their extreme discontent by joining the various protest
sites.152 In the face of such organized pressure, Facebook relented and
changed its terms back to the more consumer-friendly preceding version,
and it is unlikely they would have done so if only a few isolated email
complaints had been made.153
The stories of Ann Minch and Dave Carroll also provide anecdotal
evidence of the increased bargaining power afforded by consumers’ use of
social media. In Minch’s case, she initially tried the traditional route of
simply calling Bank of America on the phone and talking to a customer
service representative.154 She was unsuccessful, as she had little-to-no
leverage, and as she was an individual of modest means with a fairly small
credit card balance, whereas Bank of America was a large, well-capitalized
corporation.155 But, after she posted her video protest “Debtor’s Revolt” on
YouTube (which then, of course, was passed around the Internet via blogs,
Facebook, and the like) and ultimately received hundreds of thousands of
hits, Bank of America contacted her to make a favorable settlement.156
With her phone call, Minch had no bargaining power and therefore
obtained no renegotiation of her interest rate; with her YouTube video
disseminated via social media, Bank of America came back to the table and
dealt with her as a more troublesome adversary. The inescapable
conclusion is that Minch’s use of social media made the difference.
TECH JOURNAL SOUTH (Jan. 17, 2011), http://www.techjournalsouth.com/2011/01/socialmedia-exploding-globally-opening-new-opportunities-for-businesses/
(explaining
the
impact of “real-time” social networks on business development and consumer behavior).
152. See supra notes 68–85 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 79–81 and accompanying text.
154. See Minch, supra note 88. In fact, Minch characterized the Bank’s response as
“[t]ough shit.” Id.
155. Id.
156. See supra notes 90–100 and accompanying text.
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The same is true of Dave Carroll and his episode with United Airlines.
When his guitar was broken and he eventually contacted United in order to
claim compensation, he was rebuffed.157 However, after his splendid song
and video, “United Breaks Guitars,” was posted to YouTube (and to date
has received over ten million hits), United Airlines came back to the table
and was ready to deal.158 Initially, he was a single consumer bound by an
onerous form contract term, and his efforts to reach a compromise were
futile. After his effective use of social media to draw attention to his
plight, United saw Carroll as someone with whom it would behoove them
to deal more meaningfully, and he wielded greater bargaining power. It is
difficult to come to any conclusion other than that Carroll was able to
increase his bargaining power as a consumer, and this gave him much
greater power than he had to negotiate at the time of initial contract
formation (when he first bought the tickets) and even at his first attempt at
post-formation modification of the deal (when he first tried to make his
claim for compensation). Again, his use of social media changed the result
dramatically.
If consumers successfully use social media to increase their bargaining
power, then they may obtain concessions or remedies which are superior to
what they would achieve through traditional means of redress like
litigation. As a mere private party attempting to redress legal wrongs
against the merchant directly, consumers like Minch and Carroll would be
in a distinctly untenable position. Because of the prohibitive cost of
litigation, consumers in Minch’s and Carroll’s position are unlikely to be
able to mount any type of serious legal challenge or opposition to their
wealthier merchant contracting partners.159 However, Minch and Carroll
made their own relatively inexpensive videos and put them on the web
themselves, foregoing any attorneys’ fees or litigation costs. They utilized
a low-cost social media option, which wielded a much larger result with
little comparable cost.
Thus, companies are increasingly recognizing the power that
consumers have at their disposal with social media. These are no longer
isolated incidents. “Social media is very effective in shrinking the world . .
. . It has gone a long way to level the playing field to make the individual
157. See supra notes 114–15 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 116–30 and accompanying text.
159. Recent Development: Arbitration, 13 J. CONSUMER & COM. L. 35, 36 (2009)
(“Litigation being prohibitively expensive, consumers seeking minimal damages are
unlikely to pursue justice against a merchant if they must bear the burden of litigation
alone.”) (discussing Chalk v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 560 F.3d 1087, 1096 (9th Cir. 2009)); see
also Henry Barkhausen, Comment, Regulating in the Shadow of the U.C.C.: How Courts
Should Interpret State Consumer Protection Laws, 119 YALE L.J. 1329, 1338 (2010) (“As
the costs of litigation rise, it becomes more expensive for consumers to hire counsel to
defend themselves against claims by their creditors.”).
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consumer’s voice on par with the powerful public relations resources
available to large corporations.”160 As a result, savvier companies are
beginning to monitor the social media sites, scanning for complaints about
their companies, products, or services, and acting promptly to resolve any
issues.161 “We’re in a world where one person, by their actions, can make a
company look bad, and it can get echoed and amplified over and over
again. . . . The power has shifted, [so] that big companies now have to be
worried about one individual with a microphone called a blog.”162 As one
business consultant advises companies on her blog:
We are in an era of the powerful consumer. Consumers are
taking matters into their own hands, taking a vengeance against
companies for being unresponsive. These powerful consumers
refuse to be ignored and in the process they are attracting
enormous media attention, influencing consumer buying
decisions, and causing significant market damage to companies.
You need to be right there when and where consumers vent their
problems online so you can respond in an immediate and
personal way.163
Web 2.0 has arrived. Social media has given some power back to
consumers that had been lost as a result of the gradual widening of the
disparity between merchants and consumers in the age of industrialization
and the proliferation of standard form contracts.
V.

CONCLUSION

Standard form contracts are here to stay. They are efficient, and
merchants will not sell products or services unless they are able to
160. Karen L. Stevenson, Social Media Spurring Consumer Protection Litigation?, ABA
LITIGATION NEWS (Aug. 11, 2010), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigationnews/top
_stories/081110-social-media-consumer-protection.html (quoting Lynn Lincoln Sarko, who
was counsel for plaintiffs in a litigation with Procter & Gamble).
161. See Carolyn Y. Johnson, As blogs expand the reach of a single voice, firms monitor
the Internet looking for the dissatisfied, BOSTON GLOBE (Jul. 7, 2008), at 6 (including an
account of a Comcast cable customer sending a Twitter post about a problem with his
reception, and receiving a prompt reply and fix of the issue from a Comcast representative
via Twitter).
162. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Josh Bernoff, an analyst at Forrester Research); see
also Jon Yates, Using Twitter, Facebook to Submit Consumer Complaints, CHI. TRIB. PROB.
SOLVER (Apr. 23, 2010, 12:35 PM), http://newsblogs.chicagotribune.com/the-problemsolver/2010/04/social-media-as-a-consumercomplaint-avenue.html
(describing
similar
incidents involving T-Mobile, Southwest, AT&T, and Best Buy).
163. Myra Golden, Does Your Company Monitor Twitter, Facebook and Blogs for
Customer Complaints? If Not, Why Not?, MYRA GOLDEN MEDIA BLOG (Feb. 3, 2010),
http://myragolden.wordpress.com/2010/02/03/does-your-company-monitor-twitterfacebook-and-blogs-for-customer-complaints-if-not-why-not/.
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contractually inoculate themselves against certain types of risks by the
inclusion of protective boilerplate (e.g., warranty limitations and
exclusions, liability limitations, arbitration clauses, choice of law, etc.).
Consumers realize that the contract terms, like most other aspects of a deal,
are adhesive in nature—“take-it-or-leave-it.” They don’t have any
bargaining power in the formation of the contract.164 And, even if they did,
consumers suffer from multiple cognitive and decision-making defects that
would nonetheless preclude their ability to read, comprehend, and negotiate
different terms.165 All in all, consumers have very little bargaining power
when they initially decide to transact with a merchant by buying its goods
or services.
Traditionally, consumers have had no greater power once the
merchant’s goods or services create some measure of disappointment for
them. If the product breaks, or the services are faulty or unsatisfactory in
some manner (e.g., the bank raised Minch’s interest rate, the airline
damaged Carroll’s guitar and refused to pay), the consumer is contractually
bound by the limiting terms in the boilerplate under the duty to read rule of
contract law. Merchants are entitled to enforce the terms and refuse any
relief to the consumer, at least in the absence of unconscionability, fraud, or
some similar impediment to enforcement, which is rare. And, even if there
were some basis for the consumer to argue for relief, the high costs of legal
representation and litigation present an often-insurmountable obstacle to
seeking such remedies. Instead, consumers are traditionally likely to
simply call a 1-800 number or seek personal attention from one of the
merchant’s employees. However, because of the unequal power between
the parties, the merchant’s frequent decisions to refuse any such relief has
no immediate consequences, other than loss of the consumer’s repeat
business and the limited effects of traditional word-of-mouth discussion of
the consumer’s experiences. Simply put, the ironclad nature of the
merchant’s protective form contract language, coupled with the enormous
bargaining power advantage, results in the merchant being able to
effectively deny any relief to the consumer in the face of his disappointed
expectations.166
However, in the world of social media, the landscape is changing.
Ann Minch and Dave Carroll were consumers who once agreed to acquire
services from merchants by way of form contracts with one-sided
provisions that protected their respective merchants. They likely never
read the onerous terms, nor could they have likely negotiated more
favorable ones even if they had read them. However, when faced with
disappointed expectations, Minch and Carroll (not to mention the
164. See supra Part II.A.
165. See supra Part II.B.
166. See supra Part III.
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thousands of Facebook account holders who petitioned against Facebook’s
change of service terms in February 2009) took their complaints to the
social media. After their complaints went “viral,” their merchants were
compelled to approach them and offer concessions which they had been
previously unwilling to offer. As a result, these consumers were able to
obtain relief and a remedy against perceived unjust merchant behavior.167
In addition to reporting on this phenomenon, this Article simply
makes two observations about these anecdotes which are positive from a
consumer contracting perspective. First, at the point of dealing with the
disappointed expectations, the merchant and consumer are dealing on a
much more level playing field information-wise, because the contingency
which is the basis of the new dealings between the parties is now a
concrete, real event which has in fact occurred, rather than a vague,
inchoate possibility of some negative event which conceivably might occur
at some point in the distant future. In short, the parties are not dealing in
unknown hypotheticals anymore—the thing has happened (e.g., the goods
have broken down, or the service has been unsatisfactory), and so both
parties know the score. They are not dealing in informational asymmetries
that greatly favor the merchant.168 Second, and the more obvious point, the
consumer is able to wield potentially much more power over the merchant
by his or her use of a social media tool to voice his contractual
disappointment. If the video, blog entry, tweet, or Facebook post goes
“viral,” it will rapidly generate exponentially more attention than the
consumer’s traditional efforts to contact the merchant directly. This can
result in enormous pressure on the merchant to rectify the wrong in the
court of public opinion. Furthermore, the consumer has achieved this result
without necessarily paying any attorneys’ fees, litigation costs, or
encountering other traditional barriers to achieving a satisfactory remedy
against undesirable merchant behavior.169
The result is greater empowerment to consumers, or at least the
specter of it, in the world of social media and Web 2.0. The world is truly
growing ever smaller through the use of social media. Consumer
empowerment is, of course, just one potential result of this enormously
significant truth. Its influence is also playing out in other aspects of our
society, from matters of entertainment to much more significant matters of
political unrest and even revolution.170 But its development in the area of

167. Id.
168. See supra Part IV.A.
169. See supra Part IV.B.
170. See, e.g., Indira A.R. Lakshmanan, Clinton Defends Facebook, Twitter Amid Egypt
Protests, BLOOMBERG BUS. WK. (Jan. 27, 2011), http://www.newsmax.com/SciTech/
clinton-facebook-twitter-eqypt/2011/01/27/id/384064 (examining the use of social
networking to organize protests as part of the 2011 Egyptian revolution).
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consumer contract remedies is a welcomed one. Justice Louis Brandeis
famously said, “Sunlight is the best disinfectant.”171 Less famously, but
right before that sentence, Brandeis said: “Publicity is justly commended
as a remedy for social and industrial diseases.”172 With the advent of the
Internet and social media, consumers have the ability to remedy the
“disease” of grossly disproportionate bargaining power between behemoth
corporate merchants and individual consumers who buy their goods and
services. Never before has there been greater ability for consumers to
generate publicity, and thus “sunlight,” on poor treatment of them by
merchants. The result is potentially greater power for consumers, and this
is for the good.

171. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY: AND HOW
(1914).
172. Id.
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